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FROM DIONYSIUS TO ERIUGENA1 
A BRIDGE FOR VOLUNTARISM 
OR "DIVINE FREEDOM"? 
John KING-FARLOW 
RÉSUMÉ: Le style émouvant et les échos apparents d'un platonisme vraiment chrétien expliquent 
qu'on ait longtemps tenté d'identifier les œuvres du Pseudo-Denys l'Aéropagite à des écrits 
quasi autorisés d'un ami de saint Paul. Ce dernier aurait réellement vécu des siècles auparavant. 
Des siècles plus tard, le génie de Jean Scot Erigène puisait copieusement dans le Pseudo-
Aéropagite, Platon, les Écritures, etc., produisant un système éblouissant de philosophie et de 
théologie. Si ces systèmes retrouvent maintenant l'intérêt moderne, leur caractère ontologi-
quement moniste et leurs tentatives confuses de soutenir la toute-puissance de Dieu et autres 
perfections en absorbant leurs créatures, leur méritent la réprobation analytique. Le libre 
arbitre et le pluralisme ontologique appartiennent à la métaphysique de la Bible. On espère 
réintroduire les visions de deux hérétiques souvent négligés. 
SUMMARY: The moving style and apparent echoes of truly Christian Platonism left the works of 
Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite long tempting to identify with nearly authoritative writings 
by a friend of Saint Paul. The latter would have really lived centuries before. Centuries later 
the genius of John Scotus Eriugena drew copiously on the Pseudo-Areopagite, Plato, the 
Scriptures, etc., to provide a dazzling system of philosophy and theology. While these systems 
are now recovering modern interest, their ontologically Monist character and their confused 
attempts to uphold God's omnipotence and other perfections by absorbing creatures, merit 
1. Bibliographical Footnote: if one wishes to delve seriously into Eriugena's thought, the following books and 
articles prove to be among those of value. (A) John SCOTUS ERIUGENA, Periphyseon (division of nature), 
edited by John P. O'Meara and I.P. Sheldon-Williams; (Montréal and Washington: Bellarmin and Dumbarton 
Oaks, 1987). (B) Joannis SCOTI ERIUGENAE, (Oxonii; E Theatre Sheldoniano, Anno MDCLXXXI). (C) 
Johannis SCOTI ERIUGENAE, Periphyseon (De Divisione Naturae), Liber Primus, editor LP Sheldon-Wil-
liams, |Facing English and Latin texts with 47 pages of notes]. (Dublin Institute for advanced Studies, 
1968) (Liber Secundus, 1972]. (D) John the SCOT, Periphyseon/On the Division of Nature; edited and 
translated by Myra L. Uhlfelder with summaries and comments by Jean L. Potter. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1976 — includes 42 pages of Introduction; a complete translation of Book I; summaries and 
excerpts to cover Books II-V). (E) "Eriugena, John Scotus." Article by Eugene R. FAIRWEATHER. See 
Volume III, pp.44-45 of Paul Edwards, (editor), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (New York: MacMillan 
and Free Press, 1972 edition). (F) Dominic O'Meara, (editor), Neo-Platonism and Christian Thought. 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982). See especially Chapters 7, 9 and 10. Footnote 11 
cites further works on Pseudo-Dionysius and Eriugena. 
367 
JOHN KING-FARLOW 
analytical reproof. Free Will and ontological Pluralism belong with the metaphysics of the 
Bible. It is hoped to re-introduce the visions of two often neglected heretics. 
INTRODUCTION 
In his striking Aquinas Lecture of 1961, Metaphysics and Historicity, Emil Fack-
enheim declared: 
The concept of self-making occurs not only in a relatively brief period of modern 
metaphysics. It is basic to the whole metaphysical tradition which rivals the major 
Western tradition in metaphysics. The major tradition asserts that operatio sequitur 
esse. But there is also a minor tradition which asserts that, at least in the case of 
God, esse sequitur operationem. This tradition hails back possibly as far as to 
John Scotus Eriugena and, passing through such thinkers as Jacob Boehme and 
Schelling, finds a contemporary representative in Nicolas Berdyaev. In the major 
tradition, God is understood as Prime Being, and in substantial strands of that 
tradition as creating the world ex nihilo. In the minor tradition, God is understood 
as Pure Freedom who, creating ex nihilo, Himself passes ex nihilo in aliquid.2 
In a footnote Fackenheim tells us to look at Aquinas' sayings at Summa Theologiae 
I, Q. 73 and at Summa Contra Gentiles II, 21 and III, 42 for paradigmatic statements 
of the major tradition. He adds: "For the principle esse sequitur operationem one can 
only cite with hesitation John Scotus Eriugena, De Divisione Naturae I, 72. ('Deus 
ergo non erat, priusquam omnia fac ere f \ 'cum audimus Deum omnia fac ere, nihil 
aliud debemus intelligere quam Deum in omnibus esse, hoc est, essentiam omnium 
subsistere.')" But Fackenheim rapidly assures us that a typical saying of Boehme's 
like "Die Freiheit, als das Nichts, hat in sich selber kein Wesen" can be cited to 
illustrate the minor tradition without any hesitation. So, he believes, can Hegel's "the 
supreme form of Nought as a separate principle would be Freedom" be quoted with 
the same assurance.^ 
Both Eriugena's ninth century work and those of the writer on whom he draws 
so heavily, the pseudonymous 'Saint Dionysius the Areopagite' of a much earlier 
century, hold permanently challenging views which partly resemble Fackenheim's. For 
they say frequently, that God transcends all Essence and Existence; that He is not a 
being — let alone a being with a fixed nature; sometimes that His creating and His 
Creation belong with the very Sense and Reference of "God" in the minds of the 
wise. Fackenheim is quite right, however, to show himself to be wary of resting too 
much weight on Eriugena. 
2. Emil L. FACKENHEIM, Metaphysics and Historicity: The Aquinas Lecture, 1961. (Milwaukee: Marquette 
University Press, 1961), pp. 29-30. 
3. Metaphysics and Historicity, pp. 30-31. 
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One consequence will be stressed above all in this essay. It is that, even if these 
denials could not destroy Fackenheim's proposed link between God and Freedom, 
they belong more closely to the cluster of metaphysical ideas which have attracted 
the titles "Voluntarism" and "Religious Voluntarism." 
First I shall seek to clarify the cluster concept of Voluntarism and the meanings 
of "Voluntarism" which are most relevant to a discussion of the Areopagite's De 
Divinis Nominibus and of the Scot's De Divisione Naturae, Books I and III. For these 
are the texts on which I concentrate. Last, there is a rough guide to the main body 
of the essay. 
I. VOLUNTARISM FOR PURPOSES OF THIS STUDY 
Richard Taylor offers a rather vague opening sentence on Voluntarism in The 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, VIII, 270: "The name 'Voluntarism' (from the Latin 
Voluntas, 'will') applies to any philosophical theory according to which the will is 
prior to or superior to the intellect or reason." Theological Voluntarists, Taylor holds, 
include Peter Damian, St. Anselm, Ockham, Kierkegaard and William James. For 
Taylor believes that each of these figures meets the necessary and sufficient conditions 
required by his definition. A more promising 'Family' approach to such a concept, 
stripped of Wittgensteinian mystification, suggests that collections of concerns worth 
calling family concepts do have some necessary conditions, but the necessary con-
ditions' joint fulfillment need not add up to a sufficient condition for falling under the 
concept. Games are games whether or not there are any sets of necessary conditions 
for being a game which also are sufficient.4 
In her excellent essay "William Ockham: Voluntarist or Naturalist?", Marilyn 
McCord Adams has shown, in effect, why Ockham should be construed as a kind of 
Voluntarist by some worthwhile criteria, but not by all.5 She writes, apparently in the 
vein just advocated: "Usually in the secondary literature, Voluntarism is set against 
Naturalism. Both Voluntarist and Naturalist among medieval philosophers believe in 
mind and nature. But the former will tend to locate his baseline explanation of things 
in the will and its choices, whereas the latter will ground them in the nature of things. 
Unlike Aristotelian substances, Voluntarism and Naturalism admit of more of less: 
between these poles stretches a spectrum of opinions, and philosophers will be identified 
as one or the other relative to each other." (219) This is largely correct, but "relative 
to each other" might better be added to something broader like "and relative to many 
possible rational purposes for thinking and acting in context." 
What I call the Voluntarist Strand in the Areopagite and the Scot involves allegiance 
to a form of Religious Voluntarism which usually required the following tenets: 
4. See John KING-FARLOW, Self-Knowledge and Social Relations, (New York: Science History Publications, 
1978), pp. 145-155, for more systematic examination of these points about Definitions, Conditions and 
Family Resemblances. 
5. See Adams' essay in John F Wippel (editor), Studies in Medieval Philosophy, (Washington, D.C.: 1987), 
pp. 221-247. 
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(i) The unique and unbounded, transcendentally powerful Will of God is that 
which alone can determine what wise and Eiiblically minded speakers must cal morally 
good or morally evil. God's Will is the sole arbiter of what is truly right or wrong. 
(ii) Since the primary human account of "God" or 'Name of God" must be 
given, as many wise believers have learned partly from Plato and his descendants, in 
terms of GOODNESS, therefore "Goodness" — (or, really "hyper-Goodness") — is 
the primary Name to be used in praising and worshipping God, or in speaking about 
the ultimate cause of Creation. 
(iii) But modern believers could — at least sometimes — usefully look upon 
God's Goodness as resembling a logical construction out of His acts of unlimited will. 
(Someone today could revere most the Modern Masses, but accept that what he revers 
most is logical construction out of somewhat less ideal elements — modern human 
individuals who occupy certain kinds of positions in their societies). 
(iv) In keeping with the usage and beliefs of many Religious Voluntarists, God's 
choices or acts of will may in good contexts be illuminatingly called contingent. This 
would be done to bring out the fact that God has no Essence, knows no limits (or 
even 'limits') at all, and the like. But, since He has neither Essence nor Existence, 
and since He is not a being or individual either, it is usually best to say that He 
transcends necessity and contingency no less than He transcends youth and age or 
being odd and being even. (It is like Rylean Category mistake to apply such modal 
predicates as contingency or necessity to His choices.) For His choices are neither 
contingent nor necessary. Because they are God's choices, the very choices of hyper-
Goodness, it may be properly said that if God chooses and object, then that object 
will necessarily be good. Yet this does not necessitate that God must choose anything 
in particular. 
The case has now to be made that one has good reason to attribute a sometimes 
obvious Voluntarist strand (of the sort already spelled out) to the Areopagite and the 
Scot because: 
First, they both embrace and eschew some form of Pantheist Monism which leaves 
no room for independent standards of objective values; 
Second, they at times tress power or will such weight and 'atmospheric intensity', 
as when they tell us how to think and speak of God; 
Third, they treat God as transcending Existence, Essence, Values and Ideals, hence 
they speak of Him as more-than-good, hyper-Good, super-Good, hyper-Wise, and so 
on. God is said accordingly to be Himself beyond all limits and restrictions, yet the 
Judge of His creatures. Hence there is good reason to suppose that Dionysius and 
Eriugena are stating or implying in some passages that the all powerful One may 
choose arbitrarily ("freely") what is virtue and what is sin in a creature as He prefers; 
Fourth, at times they so undermine the possibility of using logic in theology and 
making almost any intelligible statements about God, that humans look obliged to 
accept the Bible's commands just because they are the commands of Supreme Power; 
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Fifth, it is absurd to weaken one's power-worship in the case of celebrating and 
obeying the Almighty — as opposed to weakening one's dedication to a being like a 
powerful human leader. But expecting God to follow a (Cognitivist) set of moral laws, 
whether He wholly prefers this or not, does weaken the power-worship of the Almighty. 
Such premises belong to what may well be valid, (if not necessarily a cogent), 
form of Good Reasons argument. For the premises are meant to supply very good 
reasons for saying that, if it is true in some passages that they endorse such assertions, 
then Dionysius and Eriugena have each exposed to us a keenly Voluntarist strand in 
their own reflections. 
Guide to the Corpus Argumentorum: "Evidence for a Voluntarist Strand: Some 
Language in Common", begins with examples which will serve to illustrate important 
positions held by both. The sections "Power-Words and Will-Words", then '"Hyper 
(-)', 'Super (-)', 'Nothing' and 'Divine Names'", both cover linguistic evidence for 
a Voluntarish strand's clear emergence in some areas of De Divinis Nominibus and 
other Dionysian writings, as well as in the Scot's De Divisione Naturae. The role of 
"hyper (-)", or "super(-)", terms for God, and the used of "Nothing" negatively and 
"Nothing" positively are considered as tools for Voluntarists. In my final section (on 
Logic and Ontology), I point out how easily certain doctrines about God's Transcen-
dence may be used to extract God from the 'limits' of logic. Here is another theme 
with connections to the Voluntarist tradition. 
II. CORPUS ARGUMENTORUM EVIDENCE 
FOR A VOLUNTARIST STRAND! SOME SIMILAR TERMS 
Fackenheim spoke of his minority tradition's going back "possibly as far as John 
Scotus Eriugena". But if this tradition stands a chance of going back to Eriugena, it 
may well stand an equal or greater chance of going back far longer in history — at 
least to Dionysius. In what follows I shall refer both to the section number of Eriugena 
(in the area of De Divisione Naturae, Book III, 619B-690B) and to the page number 
of John O'Meara's edition. These passages express Eriugena's sense of continuing in 
the steps of Dionysius.6 
[I] 63 3 A (250): "Therefore God is everything that truly is because He Himself 
makes things and is made in all things as Saint Dionysius the Areopagite says." 
[II] 640D-64IA (252): "St. Dionysius the Areopagite also in his chapter on The 
Perfect and the One says, speaking of God: 'He is called the One because He is 
universally all things ... for there is not one of the things that exist that is not a 
participant of the One.'" 
[III] 644A-645A (263-265): "Hence the great Dionysius the Areopagite in his 
book, The Celestial Hierarchy . . . in the fourth chapter, says: 'First of all, that is 
6. Also, John DILLON in "Origen's Doctrine of the Trinity and Some Later Neo-Platonic Theories" establishes 
the existence of very similar strings and themes in the writings of Origen and Proclus. See Dillon's paper 
in Dominic O'Meara (editor), Neo-Platonish and Christian Thought (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1982). Note especially pp. 22-23. 
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a true saying that by universal goodness the superessential divinity has brought 
forth into being the essence of the things that are by substantiating them'. For 
this is the property of the Cause of all things: to call into communion with Himself 
to the limit of the capacity of each of the things that are. All things, therefore, 
participate in the Providence which flows forth from the Divinity that is super-
essential and cause of all things that are." [Compare commentators' talk of "Ema-
nationism".] 
[IV] 644B (263): "And Dionysius declares this in another place too, saying: ... 
throughout the transcendence of His loving-kindness, God passes beyond Himself 
by His providential acts towards all things that are, and as it were cherishes (them) 
by His goodness and affection and love, and transcends them all and is separated 
from all things, yet condescends to be in all things in accordance with His mind-
surpassing superessential and irreversible dunamis [power] " 
There are but a very few examples among many that could have been chosen. 
Next, consider briefly the Oxford Sheldonian edition of the Latin text, (Anno 
MDCLXXXI), of De Divisione Naturae and of the Scot's translation from the Greek 
of Maximus' Scholia in Gregorium Theologum. This edition's Index notes eighteen 
general references in the De Divisione Naturae to Dionysius himself. It also lists one 
specific reference to the Areopagite's In Amatoriis Hymnis, twelve to his De Divinis 
Nominibus, one to his Epistola ad Dorotheum, one to his Epistola as Gaium, one to 
his Epistola ad Titum, six to his De Hierarchia Celesti, one to the Epistola ad 
Hierotheum, one to the De Perfecto et Uno, and three to the De Symbolica Theoiogia. 
Thus there is a total of forty-five or more extant references by Eriugena to Dionysius 
and his works just in the best known of the Scot's writings. Moreover, glances at a 
few pages will show one how both philosophers refer to Neo-Platonic and other 
inspirational sources well before Dionysius — often the same inspirational sources. 
Fackenheim might have been able to trace embryos or evolutionary ancestors of his 
'minor tradition' still further back than the early century, rather than stopping at the 
ninth.7 (Origen's thoughts on God's and man's freedom are well worth sifting, for 
example. Origen cites Eriugena's beloved Porphyry, Origen in turn is cited by Eriugena, 
while Dionysius' On the Divine Names, Chapter II, 7 seems to repeat "hoion anthè 
kai hyperousia phôta" directly from De Malorum Subsistentia of Proclus.) 
Example [III]'s final sentence shows our two philosophers' strand of common faith 
in God's utter Transcendence, as does [IV]. Examples [I], [II], [III], [IV], also reveal 
Dionysius' and Eriugena's tendency to be oscillating subtly towards themes suggestive 
of Divine Immanence, Pantheism and ontological Monism. These conflicting Monist 
and Pluralist strands need not always complement the tension between the Voluntarist 
and Cognitivist strands! 
7. One may consult Chapter 1, 545B, (twice), 589B, 589D (twice), 593A, 593C, 596B (twice), 596C, 596D, 
637B, 681B, 681D, 693B, 701A, 701B, 705A (twice), 705C, 708B, 712A, 713B, 713D, 717C (twice), 
720A (thrice), 724C, 725C, 728C, 729B, 729C (thrice), 732B, 733A, 733C, 736B (twice), 817C, 82IB, 
821C, 868B (twice), 889C (five times), 889D (nine times), 892A (eight times), 892B (five times), 892C 
(five times), 892D, 893A (five times), 893B (twice), 893C (three times), 908 (twice), 912D (twice), 937B 
("omnipotent" — seven times), 953C, 956A, 969C (twice), 98ID (last section — twice). 
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HI. POWER-WORDS AND WILL-WORDS: 
EVIDENCE FOR A VOLUNTARIST STRAND 
If a serious case is to be made for a speaking of a Voluntarist strand in Dionysius' 
most influential work, the De Divinis Nominibus, the text must be given more chance 
to speak for itself. At 828A the author appears to tip his hand. He speaks of "the 
God Who is", and this, of course, can be a specially solemn 'Name' in the mind of 
a Biblical believer. The sentence runs: "The God Who is transcends everything because 
of His power." Next consider that, in a work of modest length, the Greek word 
"dunamis", ("power"), and close variants in formation or sense, occur around one 
hundred times. Beside so much use of "dunamis" and neighbouring uses of easily 
associated words like will, command, preserve, protect, generate, subordinate, supe-
rior, notable, etc., the term "Cause" occurs here dozens of times, often with the 
flavour of dominance in its 'Efficient' and 'Emanationist' meanings. Most occurrences 
help to emphasize God's unlimited Power and the exercise of His Powers. Talk of 
Creation as a hierarchy of many levels (at 680C and Elsewhere), then of God's 
transcendence of all creatures, essences, existence, levels, is followed by scores of 
terms extolling God's Powers. These are such terms as "Sun", "unlimited", "super-
natural", "super-essential", "Nothing": one can sense a dramatic author's feeling of 
awe as he deploys such language. Such striking points about the Areopagite's choices 
of words suggest that from his table of similes, metaphors and epithets a lavish and 
distinctively Voluntaristic banquet could easily be served at moment's notice. (His 
verbiage has provided the right 'atmosphere' for the metaphysical shift.) 
But a single strand may be found, even if it is dominant in this or that context, 
not to be only one among other important strands of Faith. "When we talk of yearning, 
whether this be in God or an angel, in the mind or spirit or nature, we should think 
of a unifying and co-mingling power, which moves the superior to provide for the 
sub-ordinate" (713 A). This passage reveals both a Voluntarist strand and a rival strand 
of suggestion that God, (like good angels), must of necessity, being hyper-Good or 
good, always seek to do good things to the weaker and to establish a firm balance of 
justice. But the latter theme may well clash with the Areopagite's insistence that God 
is utterly boundless, beyond essence, etc. Why must God's hyper-Goodness seem to 
Dionysius to necessitate His doing what are good things according to Biblically trained, 
but fallible human speakers of Greek in Dionysius' era? Partly because the Areopagite 
strongly endorses what he takes to be Divine Revelation in the Bible. Partly because 
a Cognitivist strand of thinking is needed to make much sense of so many passages 
in the Bible and liturgy about Divine Justice or our "bounden duties" as human 
creatures. 
Terms like "Will", "Power", and "Volition", etc. are richly abundant in Eriugena's 
De Divisione Naturae, Book III. Eriugena, as does Dionysius, offers a lucid form of 
morally Cognitivist strand in speaking of God's creative activity. How else, one must 
ask again, could such a treatise have been allowed to survive unburned so long — 
even when widely neglected? Eriugena still wishes to follow Dionysius with loyalty 
and awe, although there may be some reasons to speak of the author's Voluntarist 
373 
JOHN KING-FARLOW 
learnings' being more cautiously shown in De Divisione Naturae. Let us compare the 
occurrences of certain terms in Book III, 661C-691A, the end of the latter Book, 
with the Voluntarist passages chosen from the Areopagite. 
In the De Divinis Nominibus "boulèsis", sometimes a fair synonym for the Latin 
"volitio", occurs only twice. But it does once at a very significant juncture, where 
clearly it is used to stress the importance of God's benevolent and loving will. In 
Eriugena we find that "volitio" ("will", "willing") and "virtus" ("strength and other 
manly qualities") contribute more importantly to the Voluntarist strand than other 
Latin terms like "potestas" or "potentia". Nevertheless, Eriugena often uses expres-
sions here that can be placed grammatically or semantically close to "Will" or "Power". 
One finds an abundance of cases, where a Will-word or Power-word is used in 
connection with God or created thing to put readers in a Voluntaristic mood — to 
create 'atmosphere'/ 
It seems then, that, whatever his surface-apparent purposes in using such language 
during his long part of Book III, Eriugena manages to create "atmospheric" conditions 
in which a Voluntarist can often feel very much at home. His artistic and psychological 
success in reaching that end — whether or not he is fully conscious of his drift — 
is strikingly similar to what Areopagite achieved with more repetition and intensity 
in some stretches of De Divinis Nominibus. 
Here are some intriguing words from Eriugena's translation of In Gregorium 
Theologum (Cap. II); "But what I had called rationes, the Holy Saint Dionysius the 
Areopagite teaches us to be called God's praedestinationes and divinas voluntates. 
[Two other holy men] say they are called divinas voluntates by the very Scriptures 
themselves ... I say that ... therefore, as Gôd knows His own voluntates, so He has 
created the things which exist, from knowledge of what such things are and from will 
to make them". 
The 'evidence' and 'data' from the two men's books surely support the theme that 
there are notably Voluntarists strands in Dionysius' and Eriugena's metaphysical sys-
8. (i) "... the Divine will which is limited by no law" (III, 661 D). "Ultra omnem legem Divina Voluntas quae 
nulla lege concluditur: Est enim lex le gum..." [A keenly, but not uniquely Voluntarist tone can be discerned], 
(ii) Declined cases of "virtus", translated as "Power" by O'Meara: 662A (virtue); 670B (Virtuti): 671A 
(Virtutibus); 677D; 679B; 680B; 681 B; 682A; 687D |("the One is multiple in power")]; 690A. (Total: 1 1 ). 
(iii) "subjected", "subject" 662D — (not used in connection with "God", but useful in conjuring up more 
associations with "compulsion", "limitation", etc.). 
(iv) "... Divine Will which is constrained by no law" (670A). 
(v) "The Divine Providence can — |has the power to| — administer all things not in one way, but in 
infinitely many" (670A). 
(vi) Vis is specially strong term, the root of "violence" in English. "Seminal force" occurs at 671C; 67ID; 
672B (twice); 672C (5 times). [One use of "seminal force" is placed beside uses of "vis feminalis" and 
"vis feminarum"]. 
(vii) "Volitions": 673B (four times); 673C (twice); 673D (four times); 674A (four times); 674B: 674C 
(twice). (Total: 16). 
(viii) " Will" ("voluntas"): 66ID; 673B (three times); cf. "willed" (twice); 675B (five times and verb "will" 
"will" five times); (676B) (verb, twice); 676C (verb, once). [Total: 271. 
(ix) "For He is without beginning and without cause, for before Him there is nothing to stand in relation 
to Him as beginning or cause, but He Himself creates the nature of all ihings of which He is Cause and 
Beginning" (688C). No objectively eternal values and purposes seem to bind Him. 
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terns. I certainly do not claim that they deserve to be called materials from premises 
in a crushingly cogent deductive argument with the conclusion: "They are both at all 
times out-and-out Voluntarists". Eriugena writes like an unreserved Cognitivist at III, 
622B ff., of how correctly De Divinis Nominibus showed the nature of Divine Provi-
dence and the objective order of primodial causes: Supreme Goodness or Goodness-
in-Itself; Essence; Life; Supreme and True Reason; the Supreme and True Intellect; 
the Divine Providence. The literary and psychological crafting may appear there, as 
often elsewhere in De Divisione Naturae, to sparkle with expressions of Cognitivism. 
iv. 'HYPER (-)', 'SUPER (-)', 'NOTHING' AND DIVINE NAMES 
One should consider next Dionysius' theological impact is so frequently using 
negatives and "hyper" and "super". One is struck by certain kinds of noun-phrases 
and adjectival-phrases, and by the adverbial-phrases that he tended to underplay. One 
may usefully try speaking for him by placing his favoured word "unified" before each 
of the expressions. This is to show that they are terms used par excellence by followers 
of Scripture to talk about the Godhead as a perfect unity. We may find Dionysius' 
stress on talk of "Unified Names" to be less helpful for the expression of the Divine 
Simplicity in our time, but a move that was very natural in his own. With profound 
consequences for medieval philosophers, not least those with a taste for mysticism or 
Saint Augustine's stress on the expression "the Divine Light", the Areopagite went 
on to give paradigmatic-sounding examples of 'Unified Names'. He proceeds not by 
giving a Euclidean type of definition, but by showering the devout reader with examples 
of hyper-language, such as "The Hyper-Good", "The Hyper-Infinite", "beyond know-
ing", "beyond-the-intelligible", "TheHyper-God", "TheHyper-Being", "TheTrans-
cendentally Wise", and others in great numbers. What seems clear is that these and 
similar terms must always be applied, according to Dionysius, to the Trinity taken as 
One. Other terms, which are not so 'unified', pertain uniquely to one Person of the 
Trinity. 
Some light is shed on what Dionysius can strive to communicate by using the 
preposition or prepositional prefix "hyper (-)" ("over") to evoke some modest human 
understanding of "God is All-Transcendent". But some light is removed if Transcen-
dence blocks all analogy or likeness with the familiar world.9 
9. One possible explanation among others of the apparent contradiction in Dionysius between encouraging 
ideas of analogy, then turning them away with "hyper" is this. J.L. AUSTIN speaks of perlocutionary uses 
of language ones main point is saying something is not conventional communication of the words' meaning, 
but achieving an unconventionally linked effect. Thus one says "I have a terrible headache" to make a 
loquacious visitor stop talking, or to make him aware of his loquacity; or to give someone else present a 
secret "Pass-Word". Dionysius may believe to some extent that only overstatement of lack of analogy may 
fit the holy task of overcoming idolatry and anthropocentrism — such is the fallenness and misguidedness 
of humans. Something analogous to what he may want at times to convey by undermining his own case 
for analogy might be put like this: God is so minimally like us that no humanly intelligible predicate is 
consistently illuminating as a predicate, since God is without properties. Only certain complete and extended 
bodies of sentential utterance, offered in certain contexts, are usually going to inform us at all about God: 
the predicate is at best like a small nut in a complex machine for vehicles of theological communication. 
Compare the modern distinction between objectivai and Substitional Quantification. In this case Dionysius 
is like one who meets Gottlob Frege's famous saying that only in the context of a sentence does a work 
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Let us put our faith for a moment in a lexicon of Liddell and Scott. Often in 
Homer and Greeks up to Herodotus, "hyper" works with a genitive noun-phrase to 
convey that if X is placed on a level above Y's level then that X is in a state of rest. 
Yet it is also used in the same period to suggest that X is moving above Y.10 
Given that there is such a heady semantic mixture for a native speaker of ancient 
Greek, many so called "unifying numbers" of the Areopagite could be said to activate 
a host of disambiguations all at once. God is the best possible person among persons 
we know. God is like such a person, but has risen to a barely comprehensible level 
of excellence; God has risen beyond understandable excellence. God is so far above 
human assessment or measurement in any respect that traditionally bowing dov/n and 
worshipping Him is imperative or worship is a primitive, ignorant waste of time. God 
is utterly greater that the greatest number. God is so far above us in powers and 
consequent authority that He may order us to change our number system, to swallow 
contradictions, to change our words' meanings back and forth as He pleases from His 
unreachable throne. 
One of the most valuable 'Names' for God is thus taken by the Areopagite and 
the Scot to be "Nothing" — as opposed to "nothing". At III, p.680, Eriugena's 
Alumnus asks for an explanation of Sacred Theology's use of "Nothing" as a name 
for God. Nutritor replies by referring first to an aspect "ineffabilem et incomprehen-
sibilem Divinae Naturae", second to God's "inaccessibilemque ciaritatem omnibus 
intelectibus". God is sw/^ressential and supernatural. (Note super-\ very mixed gram-
matical role as prepositional prefix): "Dum ergo incomprehensibilis intelligent; per 
excellentiam NIHILUM non immerito vocitatur". "How is it, then, that we can talk 
of this transcendent Nothing of No-Thing", someone would ask? "Revelation, grace, 
faith, and above all biblical Revelation", Dionysius and Eriugena would reply. It seems, 
then, that God is a No-thing of which we can begin to talk because of His powers to 
cause many things to happen in our lives: we should be grateful, not skeptical. This 
is an understandable outcome of adopting unduly harsh or Voluntarist assumptions, 
then taking excessive recourse to "hyper (-)" or "super (-)", and finally using "Trans-
cendence" as the ultimate trump card in theological discussions. 
V. LOGIC AND ONTOLOGY: ADDED PERPLEXITIES 
Much of Book I of De Divisione Naturae, crowded with quotations from Dionysius, 
is devoted to matters of Aristotelian Logic and its applicability or inapplicability to 
God, Goodness itself, formless matter, Genus, Species and natural individuals. (Com-
pare De Divinis Nominibus, Chapter I). Considerable space is given to aspects of 
Aristotelian categories. Here are some of the more notable conclusions: (i) "All the 
have meaning with the inspirational, perlocutionary reply that only in the context of pious life, Div ne light 
and a thrice-read, five-volume book will many a theological word contribute to proper understanding for 
humans. 
10. Or it can mean that X lies geographically beyond Y in some significant direction when X and Y are both 
found on the surface of the earth. More generally X can be said to be acting for the sake of Y, for Y's 
protection, for Y's best interests. Compare further: causes of Y, reasons for Y ... 
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categories are in Ousia when considered in themselves" (479A). (ii) "... none of the 
aforesaid ten categories which Aristotle defined ... is accessible to the bodily senses. 
For Ousia is incorporeal ... while the other nine categories are about or within it" 
(478C). (iii) "God is none of the things that are predicated literally of Him, as it is 
just to predicate of God all things that are, but by a kind of metaphor because they 
derive from Him" (480B). (iv) "... the essence of all existing things most fit to have 
their subject terms associated literally with predicates is local and temporal..." (481C). 
(v) "Nobody can define Ousia itself or say what it is" (487B). "... only this definition 
can be predicated of God: that He is He who is More-than-Being". (487B)" 
A major problem is set up for the metaphorical-analogical account of Divine 
Names and human predicates which underpins many of the thoughts in the quotations 
which have just been given. At 459B, near the very start of Book I, Nutritor had 
already stated: "If therefore the aforesaid Divine Names are confronted by other names 
directly opposed to them, the things which are properly signified by them must also 
of necessity be understood to have contrary opposites to them; and therefore they 
cannot be properly predicated of God, to Whom nothing is opposed, and with Whom 
nothing is found to be eternal which differs from Him by nature". The remedy which 
the Scot puts forward in the same paragraph is to allow that what we really should 
have in mind when we attribute something to God is a super-something. We should 
use the way of denial and say: "He is good and is not good. So He is not good." 
As has been seen, Eriugena now feels happy to exempt God from the Aristotelian 
Law of Contradiction and the Law of Excluded Middle both when ordinary predicates 
are metaphorically applied to "God" and when hyper-predicates beyond the grasp of 
secular logicians are introduced. And God is said at times to be One with such curious 
partners, like Creation, that the Law of Identity can easily obtain and easily break 
down as well. For God, we are told, can be Form and not-Form, Formlessness or 
Not-Formlessness, but also be neither one or the other, but only Super-Form. And 
this is a curious whole- or part-identity for a Deity to be assigned. 
At Categories 13b 20-35 Aristotle offers two remarks which Dionysius and Eriu-
gena might have served themselves by heeding. On the one hand, the Law of Excluded 
Middle (like that of Contradiction) carries something resembling Austinian Felicity 
Conditions: only pairs of contradictories, not contrary propositions may be used as 
the non-logical kinds of place-holders. On the other hand, the Felicity Conditions also 
require that some kind of existential presupposition be met by the intended referent 
of the subject term. Aristotle gives the example that "Socrates is ill or Socrates is 
not-ill" only serves a speaker and listener well if such a person as Socrates exists at 
the relevant time. Thus the way of saving theology's supposedly tenuous spark of 
meaning with hyper-predicates may be pursued in order to extract the Deity and His 
subject terms from the demeaning 'limits of Logic', for "God", like "formless matter", 
cannot be gripped by its Laws. And if metaphorical usage is much too loose or vague, 
or is brought close to being unintelligible, then the way of metaphor may also serve 
to spring "God" and Names of God from any inferential trap. 
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Such a solution, however, is likely to appeal mainly to those in the tradition of 
partly anti-logical forms of Religious Voluntarism associated with the reasoning of 
Peter Damian and Descartes. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Emil Fackenheim sets out rather hesitantly to trace back to Eriugena a minor 
tradition — but supposedly more valuable tradition — within Philosophia Perennis. 
This is a tradition of stressing God's Freedom and Self-Making as his primary features 
and as those about which humans should meditate most of all. Fackenheim appears 
vulnerable on several accounts. His hesitation to include Eriugena in the tradition 
shows that he overlooks or quite surprisingly underestimates the abundant textual 
support he received from De Divisione Naturae. More important, he fails to recognize 
obvious reasons for following his favoured tradition back into pockets of much earlier 
Hellenistic thinking — among primarily Biblical believers. 
There is a matter more worthy of comments, for purposes of reflection on Phi-
losophia Perennis, (and not just on Boehme's or Eriugena's theological and mystical 
ancestors). It is the failure of Fackenheim to distinguish conflicting Voluntarist and 
Cognitivist strands in Eriugena's thinking and to look for similar conflicts in other 
contributors to his minor tradition. Again considerations of God, Meaning, and Logic 
must be raised in assessing the successors. For what appears in 'Dionysius the Areo-
pagite' may recur as late as in Hegel, and even in some more recent, partly Hegelian 
believers, who would not really wish to embrace all conflicts as dialectically creative. 
One should finally emphasize that a strongly Voluntarist and meta-ethically Non-
Cognitivist strand in Dionysius, Eriugena or some heirs to such a minor tradition is 
likely to bring harm to the simply popular Faith which they advocate. Such of 'Divine 
Freedom' and 'Divine Self-Making without Restraints' may serve to undermine people's 
trust in the relevance of a 'hyper-Good' God to human life. It may undercut any trust 
in alleged reasons for loving Him and His creatures. And so these ways of speaking 
about the Divine and the Divine God may eventually serve to disintegration of human 
commitment to pursuing anything at all that is held to be Good in Itself, to be worth 
loving for its own sake. Not only holiness, kindness or justice, but even our own human 
flourishing may seem to have no claims against unfettered caprice." Thank God for 
the major tradition of those like Saint Thomas.12 
11. In pursuing this research I have greatly appreciated the advice and encouragement of my colleague, Martin 
Tweedale. 
12. Those who feel a growing fascination for the Areopagite and the Scot may find it useful to note that 
contributors to O'MKARA'S Neo-Platonism and Christian Thought — see Footnote 1 — mention the utility 
of a number of less accessible works on Pseudo-Dionysius and Eriugena. Especially useful among them 
are A. VAN DEN DAELE, Indices Pseudo-Dionysiani, (Louvain, 1941); R. ROQUES, L'univers dionyséen, 
(Paris, 1954), and Libres sentiers vers l'érigénisme, (Rome, 1975); J.M. HORNUS, "Les recherches récentes 
sur le Pseudo-Denys lAreopagite", Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie religieuses, 35 (1955), pp. 404-448 
and 41 (1961), pp. 22-27; l.R SHELDON-WILLIAMS, "Henads and Angels; Proclus and the ps.-Dionysius", 
Studia Patristica, (Berlin, 1972), pp. 65-71; N. CAPPUYNS, Jean Scot Erii>èm\ (Paris, 1933); T. GREGORY, 
Giovianni Scoto Eriugena, (Florence, 1963); H. BEIT, Johannes Scotus Eriugena, (New York, 1964); J. 
O'MEARA and L. BILI.ER. (editors), The Mind of Eriugena, (Dublin, 1973); S. GERSCH, From lamhlichus 
to Eriugena, (Leyden, 1978); E. JEANEAU, Quatre thèmes Erigeniens, (Montréal, 1978). 
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